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摘  要 
 
 
摘  要 
随着 20 世纪 90 年代家族控制的上市公司逐步进入西方学者的视野，他们开
始对其展开激烈的研究，但是在很多领域意见尚未统一。与此同时，以 La Porta
等学者为代表的学者将法律环境制度引入公司的研究，掀起了一场“法与金融”
的浪潮。本文基于家族控制与治理环境的双重视角，收集了 2004-2007 年 1486

















































































As the family controlled listed companies came into western scholars’ view in 
1990s, they start to begin the research intensely, but still lots of disagreements in 
many fields were left unsolved. At the same time, the scholars, represented by La 
Porta et al, introduce the law environment into the study of companies, setting off a 
wave of “law and finance”. Based on the duple angles of family control and 
institutional environment, this paper collects 1486 A-share listed companies as 
samples for the period through 2004 to 2007, uses method of logistic regression 
model and Tobit regression model to analyze the relationship between the family 
control, institutional environment and cash dividend policy. This paper studies the 
family control and institutional environment, which is respectively one of the 
important inner- and outer-governance mechanisms, into a consistent framework to 
analyze their influence on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Furthermore, 
improvement of institutional environment may contribute to the improvement of cash 
dividend policy of family controlled listed companies.  
This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background and 
objectives of study, defines correlative concepts and research scope, sorts out the main 
thought of the paper. Based on the principal-agent theory, Chapter 2 reviews the 
literatures and purposes eight research hypotheses of the paper. Chapter 3 discusses 
the research design, introduces the sample selecting process, data sources and each 
kinds of variable’s definition in detail. Furthermore, establishes six regression models 
for the empirical research. In Chapter 4, the paper discusses the description and 
analysis of the empirical results; perform some empirical researches, including 
descriptive statistics, comparative analyses and regression analyses and finally, 
conducts a stability test. And Chapter 5 suggested conclusion, recommendation, and 
also includes deficiency of the paper. 
















and internationally, the paper uses the theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to 
discuss the relationship between family control, institutional environment and cash 
dividend policy of listed companies. The main conclusion of this empirical research is 
following: First, family controlled listed companies have lower willingness to pay 
(WTP) of cash dividends and expenditure standard of cash dividends. Second, if the 
institutional environment is better, the willingness to pay (WTP) of cash dividends 
and the expenditure standard of cash dividends in listed company are higher. Third, 
the negative influence for the expenditure standard of cash dividends in family listed 
companies is significant only in the areas with lower standard of institutional 
environment. Fourth, the improvement of institutional environment may help to 
improve the willingness to pay (WTP) and the expenditure standard of cash dividends 
in family controlled listed companies.  
Based on the conclusions suggested, we believe that, on one hand, family 
controlled listed companies may have more serious agency problem, that is why they 
have lower willingness to pay (WTP) and expenditure standard of cash dividends than 
non-family listed companies; on the other hand, in our country, the improving 
institutional environment can raise the willingness to pay (WTP) and the expenditure 
standard of cash dividends in listed company. For these reasons above, supervisory 
authority should guide the family listed companies to improve their management 
efficiency. At the same time, supervisory authority should improve the institutional 
environment, such as improve various related laws and regulations, reduce the 
government to intervene the listed companies, building a more healthy and orderly 
environment for the listed companies. This paper also provides a new visual angle for 
research of listed companies’ cash dividend policy.  
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纪 90 年代，随着美国以外的其他国家对公司治理研究逐渐感兴趣，La Porta 等
（1999）[1]、Claessens 等（2000）[2]和 Facio and Lang（2002）[3]发现基于股权分




























英国 8000 家大公司中 76%是家族企业，他们的产值占 GNP 的 70% 
德国 所有企业的 80%是家族企业 
澳大利亚 80%的非上市公司和 25%的上市公司是家族控制公司 
韩国 家族企业占企业总数的 48.2% 
印度 500 家大公司中有 75%是家族控制的，注册公司中 99%是家族企业 
意大利 
所有工业公司员工超过 50 人的公司有 46%是家族企业，员工在 20-500 人之
间的公司有 80%是家族企业 
荷兰 所有企业中的 80%是家族企业，员工超过 100 人的企业中 50%是家族企业 
西班牙 年度销售额超过 200 万美元的公司中 71%是家族企业 
拉丁美洲 家族企业占非国有公司的 80%-90% 
资料来源：洛桑国际管理学院,《世界竞争力报告》,家族企业网络（The Family Business Network, FBN）,
瑞士, 2000 年（转引至：张余华, 家族企业发展进程及治理模式研究[M], 第 4 页）[4]。   
 
表 2：东亚与欧洲部分国家（或地区）上市公司家族持股比例  单位：% 
东亚国家（或地区） 家族持股比例 欧洲国家 家族持股比例 
泰国 51．9 法国 64．8 
印度尼西亚 67．3 德国 64．6 
日本 4．1 意大利 59．6 
韩国 24．6 奥地利 52．9 
马来西亚 42．6 比利时 51．5 
菲律宾 46．4 瑞士 48．1 
新加坡 44．8 爱尔兰 24．6 
中国香港 71．5 挪威 38．6 
中国台湾 45．5 西班牙 55．8 














第一章  引言 
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家族企业近年在国内也以迅猛的势头飞速发展，在 20 世纪 90 年代，私营企
业的注册户数只有 13.9 万户，注册资金 221.2 亿元。经过短短十几年的发展，据
国家工商总局的统计（见表 3），截止到 2006 年底，登记注册的全国私营企业
达到 498.1万户，比 2005年增加 68.1万户，增长 15.8%，占全国企业总数的 57.4%，
比 90 年代初的 13.9 万户的注册数增加了近 35 倍；注册资金总额为 76029 亿元，
比 2005 年增加了 14698 亿元，增长了 24%，比 90 年代初的 221.2 亿元增加了近
342 倍。 
 
表 3：1996-2006 年全国个体、私营企业发展基本境况 
 年份 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
户数 
（万户） 







2165 2574 3120 3439 3315 3436 3782 4187 5058 5810 6469 
户数 
（万户） 












的产值占 GDP 得比重也是以惊人的速度提高（见表 4）。从表中可以看出，从
1996 年开始，私营经济产值占 GDP 得比重基本上保持每年增长一个百分点。到
2000 年，私营经济的产值比重首次超过了 10%，2006 年则达到了 15.11%。已经
成为国民经济增长中不可或缺的一部分。1999 年，由中国社会科学院社会学所、




















表 4：1996-2006 年个体、私营经济占 GDP 比重    单位：% 
年份 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
个体经济 4.97 5.77 7.06 7.88 7.22 6.68 6.62 6.44 5.07 5.36 5.09
私营经济 4.53 4.97 6.93 8.57 10.83 11.45 12.75 14.79 14.35 14.98 15.11












角：即家族控制与公司价值（ Anderson and Reeb,2003[9]; Villalonga and 
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5 
20 世纪 90 年代直至今日，市场化取向的改革已经经历了四分之一个世纪。尽管
这一转轨过程取得了举世瞩目的成功，但对于中国这一幅员辽阔的国家来说，各
个地区之间的市场化进程并不平衡。不同地区之间公司可能面临着有明显差异的
制度环境。以 La Porta 等为代表的经济学家和法学家将法律引入了公司治理的研
究领域，指出大股东控制会造成对小股东的利益侵占，这种侵占程度显著地受到





































资料来源：根据樊纲等（2006）报告的中国各地区 2004 年治理环境指数整理所得。 
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